Determinants of the Timing and Incidence of Exploratory Drilling on Offshort Wildcat Tracts by Kenneth Hendricks & Robert H. Porter
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
DETERMINANTS OF THE TIMING AND
INCIDENCE OF EXPLORATORY DRILLING
ON OFFSHORE WILDCAT ThACFS
Kenneth Hendricks
Robert H. Porter
Working Paper No. 4605




We aregratefulto the NSF and the SSHRCC for financial support,. and to Anne de Melogue.
Patrick Greenlee, Martin Pesendorfer, Robert Picard, and Diana Whistler for capable research
assistance. We also thank the participants in a number of seminars for helpful comments.
This paper is part of NEER's research program in Industrial Organization. Any opinions
expressed are those of the authors and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #4605
December 1993
DEThRMINANTS OF THE TIMING AND
INCIDENCE OF EXPLORATORY DRILLING
ON OFFSHORE WILDCAT Th.ACrs
ABSTRACT
This paper documents exploratory drilling activity on offshore wildcat oil and gas leases
in the Gulf of Mexico that were sold between 1954 and 1990, with emphasis on the period before
1980. For each year of the lease, we study the determinants of the decision whether or not to
begin exploratory drilling, and the outcome of any drilling activity. Our results indicate that
equilibrium predictions of plausible noncooperative models are reasonably accurate, and more
descriptive than those of cooperative models of drilling timing. We discuss why noncooperative
behavior may occur, and the potential gains from coordination.
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CANADA and NBERI.INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 1954, the United States government has
auctioned the oil and gas rights to the offshore federal lands, in
thousands of parcels. These parcels, known as tracts, cover five
thousand acres on average.Tracts are large by onshore
standards, although not necessarily by the standards of typical
hydrocarbon fields. Purchase of a tract does not obligate the
buyer to conduct exploratory drilling. Indeed, Kenneth Hendricks,
Robert Porter and Bryan Boudreau (1987), In their study of Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) tracts off the coasts of Texas and
Louisiana sold between 1954 and 1969, document that twenty-
nIne percent of wildcat leases expired without any wells being
drilled. The tracts with expired leases received bonus bids
averaging $800,000 in 1972 dollars. The lease term was five
years in this period.
The oil and gas rights to OCS wildcat leases are sold
simuttaneously in a first price sealed bid auction. A wildcat sale
consists of tracts in areas where there has not been prior
exploratory drilling, and no on-site drilling Is permitted prior to the
sale. Firms have access only to seismic information, and as a
consequence face considerable uncertainty. Typically, more than
a hundred tracts are sold at once. The tracts tend to be
scattered throughout the region, but dusters of tracts are not
uncommon. Further, tracts within the same area often share
common geological features, and a subset may be located over
a common pool. In either case, the ex post value of nearby
1leases will be correlated.Hence, there is an information
externalityassociated withexploratorydrilling,and
noncooperative drilling plans may be inefficient.
This paper documents exploratory drilling activity on
wildcat OCS tracts In the Gulf of Mexico that were sold between
1954 and 1990, with particular emphasis on those sold before
1980. For each year of the lease, we study the determinants of
the decision whether or not to begin exploratory drilling, and the
outcome of any drilling activity. The purpose is not to estimate
a structural model, but rather to provide some empirical
regularities as a prelude to future structural modelling. Our
results Indicate, however, that reduced form predictions of
plausible noncooperative game theoretic models are reasonably
accurate.
We locus our attention on tracts with five year leases,
which account for the vast majortty of tracts sold In the Gulf of
Mexico in our sample period. The lease term applies only to the
exploration phase. A lease is relinquished if exploratory activity
has not begun by the end of the lease term. However, if
exploration is successful, and the tract is productive, then the
lease is automatically renewed. The lease of a productive tract
is terminated when production stops. The five year lease term will
affect the exploration decision, but not developmental drilling or
subsequent production decisions.Therefore, we focus on
exploratory drilling.
2The exploration decision is a costly one, in that
unsuccessful drilling can cost millions of dollars. In addition,
outcomes are uncertain. In our sample, only half of the tracts that
were explored yielded positive revenues (i.e., production was
commercially viable), and so many tracts were unprofitable, ex
post. Further, revenues on productive tracts were quite variable.
For example, the sample standard deviation of the logarithm of
discounted revenues on productive tracts is approximately 1.5.
As a result, Information concerning likely drilling outcomes could
have been quite valuable.
We believe that the decision to abandon tracts without
exploratory drilling is a rational one, and In part reflects thearrival
of post-sale information. A lease is like an option to drill, and the
drilling decision akin to the (costly) exercise of an option. The
option may not be exercised for one of several reasons. First,the
winner of the auction discovers which thai firms bid, If any, on the
tracts offered for sale, and at what level. This information is
released at a public meeting held shortly after the sale. Second,
a firm may acquire more tracts than anticipated, and notbe
capable of exploring them all within the lease term.This Is
unlikely to account for abandonment of leases, becausethere is
an active rental market in drilling rigs. Third, ifoil or gas prices
fall unexpectedly after the lease sale, then marginally profitable
tracts will be abandoned. In our sample, real welihead prices are
virtually constant prior to 1973, and the timingand incidence of
drilling is similar before and after 1973. (Most oil price surprises
3between 1973 and 1980 were favorable to the industry.) More
generally, as noted by James Paddock, Daniel Siegel and James
Smith (1988), the option holder has an incentive to wait to the
end of the lease If there Is sufficient uncertainty concerning
prices.
Finally, if exploration is delayed, the lease holder could
observe drilling outcomes on neighboring tracts. In our 1988
study of drainage auctions, we argued that tract productivities are
highly correlated within narrow geographic areas, and that drilling
outcomes on neighboring tracts are more accurate predictors of
tract productivity than seismic records. Because drilling is costly,
there is a consequent incentive to delay, and free ride onany
information acquisition on neighboring leases. As Hendricks and
Dan Kovenock (1989) demonstrate, some equilibria of these
games of timing result in delay, relative to an optimal plan. These
situations are sometimes described as wars of attrition. (See also
Hendricks and Charles Wilson (1989) and Mark Isaac (1987).)
The symmetric (mixed strategy) equilibrium outcome of these
finite horizon games of timing exhibits a deadline effect. At the
end of the lease, there should be an Increase In the number of
tracts that are explored, relative to the number of previously
unexplored tracts. In our data, both the number of tracts drilled
and the hazard rate (the proportion Ofremaining, or not yet
explored, tracts that are drilled) are declining functions of the
number of quarters that the lease has been held,except in the
last year, when both rates Increasedramatically. That is, both the
4fraction of tracts drilled and the associated hazard rate follow a
U-shaped pattern over the term of the lease. Such a deadline
effect is also present in the data for the individual sale years in
our sample, so that it cannot easily be ascribed to aggregation
over dissimilar samples.
In addition, we present some evidence that firms update
their Information rationally. Initially, a tract is more likely to be
explored the more the lease owner bid to acquire it, but as time
progresses bid levels are decreasingly accurate predictors of
whether drilling will be Initiated.Instead, firms appear to be
Increasingly reliant on the information generated by post-sale
drilling activity in the local geographic area. We also present
some evidence that If lease holdings In an area are relatively
asymmetric, then drilling Is less likely to be delayed, consistent
with the internalization of information externalities.
We also examine drilling outcomes, and whether they are
correlated with the determinants of drilling activity. We find that
the determinants we correlated with drilling outcomes, but there
is some evidence of over-response to some factors.
Finally, we present a simple theoretical model of the timing
decision, and compare noncooperative equilibria and optimal
coordinated drilling plans. We argue that the incidence and
timing patterns in our data are more consistentwith
noncooperative behavior. We discuss why noncooperative
behavior may predominate, and we describe the potential gains
from coordination.
5The exploration decision has been examined previously by
Dennis Epple (1985), Scott Farrow and Marshall Rose (1992),
Franklin Fisher (1964), Hendricks and Alfonso Novales (1987),
Frederick Peterson (1975), and Peter Relss (1990), among others.
Several of these authors have noted that Information externalities
may be an important factor in exploration. The empirical studies
have employed more aggregate data than ours. An advantage of
our data set Is that we observe both actions and outcomes on
individual tracts. That is, our data set contains unusually detailed
information.
II. QUARTERLY HAZARD RATES, 1954-1990
Before discussing drilling decisions at annual frequencies
for our comprehensive 1954-1979 data set, we begin by analyzing
quarterly drilling patterns for the full 1954-1990 sample. There are
6,178 wildcat tracts in our larger sample, which includes tracts
sold by March 21, 1990. A wildcat lease is in an area that has
not been explored previously, and only seismic surveys are
permitted prior to wildcat auctions. We restrict attention to tracts
off the coasts of Texas and Louisiana, where the high bid was
accepted, and firms submitted fixed bonus bids with royalty
payments preset at one sixth of revenues. (Some tracts were
sold under atternative auction rules, and have been deleted from
our sample.) All tracts had five year leases. We aggregate the
monthly drilling data to the quarterly level, because it takes about
three months to set up and begin an exploratory drilling program.
Some tracts are drilled after the twentieth quarter, and are
6classified as such. For a few tracts, drilling records indicate that
initial drilling began after the twenty-third quarter; these tracts are
classified as never explored. Tracts registered as first drilled after
the twentieth quarter we either misclassified, or else exploration
began in time but drilling itself started after the five year dock
expired. Alternatively, an extension may have been granted if the
government delayed the sale of the tract, in the process of
deciding whether to reject the winning bid as inadequate.
Table 1 describes the first quarter in which drilling began
for each lease, as well as the number of leases that were never
explored. Because our drilling information only covers up to
January 1991, there Is some attrition from the sample due to
censoring in later quarters. For example, if a tract sold in
December 1989 had not been drilled on or before January 31,
1991, we do not know whether it was drilled after the fourth
quarter of its lease. The risk set Includes the tracts remaining In
a given quarter that had not yet been drilled. The risk set
therefore falls over time as tracts are drilled, or if we can no
longer observe whether they have been drilled.
The striking feature of Table 1 is the U-shaped pattern In
the number of tracts drilled in a given quarter, and especially in
the (Kaplan-Meier) hazard rate. The quarterly hazard rate is
plotted in Figure 1. There is an Increase in both numbers atthe
beginning of the lease term, as there is an adjustment periodIn
setting up an exploratory drilling program. (The initial increasein
the hazard rate is also characteristic of some noncooperative
7drilling equilibria, as we demonstrate below in Section VI.)
Thereafter, the hazard rate declines monotonically until the twelfth
quarter, slowly Increases after that, and then jumps up in the
quarters 191 20, and 21, with a peak in quarter 20. In this sample,
30 percent of the 4,112 tracts In the potential risk set In quarter
23 were never explored. A similar pattern Is evident if the drilling
data are plotted at monthly or annual frequencies.
The table reports standard errors for the hazard rates. If
H is the hazard rate in quarter t, and R the size of the risk set,
then the variance of the hazard Is H(1 - H.)/R. The standard
error of the difference in hazard rates over time can then be
approximated by the square root of the sum of the lndMdual
variances. (This is an approximation, because the hazard rates
in different periods are not independent.) By this method, the
increase in the hazard rate between quarters 19 and 20 is
significant, with a t-statistic of 2.34.
Tracts sold inthe1 980s may be somewhat
unrepresentative, because the number of tracts offered for sale
increased rapidly. Therefore, the rate of explorationmay have
slowed, and the fraction of leases that were never exploredmay
have increased. In this sample, 2,255 tracts were sold in the
1954-1979 period, and 3,923 during 1980-1990. As a check on
whether our more detailed 1954-1979 data set is similar to the full
1954-1990 sample, Table 2 reproduces the calculations of Table
1 for the 1954-1979 period. Note that, in the 1954-1979sample,
there is no censoring of observations. Asmight be expected, a
8smaller fraction of tracts were never explored, 24 percent, but a
similar pattern in the hazard rates Is evident, as Figure 2 depicts.
Ill. ThE 1954-1979 DATA
Our comprehensive data set consists of wildcat tracts off
the coasts of Texas and Louisiana that were auctioned between
1954 and 1979, Inclusive. In our sample period, 2,510 tracts
received bids. The high bid was rejected by the government on
255 tracts, and so 2,255 leases were sold. All were five year
leases, with ownership reverting to the government if exploration
did not begin within that period. In 75 cases, exploratory drilling
began after the five year lease horizon, according to well drilling
records, and we classify these tracts as being never drilled. (The
following results do not change much If these tracts are classified
as having been drilled in the fifth or sixth year after acquisition.)
The government has divided this offshore region into 51
separate geographical areas. For the purposes of this paper, we
consider all tracts within a given area to be potential neighbors.
This Is almost surety too broad a classification of the set of tracts
with correlated deposit sizes, but the implementation of a finer
(and more accurate) definition would be difficult. On the other
hand, adjoining leases may lie in two different areas. (One could
exploit spatial correlation methods, as in Anne Case (1991).The
difflcutty in our data set would be matching tract identification
measures with tract locations, in order to compute distances.
Also, the degree of spatial correlation is probably not uniform
over the region we consider.) For each area, we createthree
9variables to capture local drilling experience. They Include the
total number of tracts explored to date (the number drilled), the
number of drilled tracts that were productive (the number of hits),
and total discoveries on productive tracts (the sum of the
logarithm of discounted real revenues on productive tracts —
where a5 percent discount rate Is employed, and wellhead prices
In 1972 dollars as of the date of sale of lndMdual tracts are used
to evaluate oil, gas, condensate and miscellaneous production.)
In our regressions, we employ the change in all three historical
variables since the sale date for indMdual tracts for each year
after they were acquired (that is, the post-sale experience In the
relevant area). These post-sale variables are denoted ORPOST,
HITPOST, and REVPOST. The three variables employed are the
logarithm of (one plus) the total number of tracts explored since
the sale date (ORPOST; It equals zero if there were no tracts
drilled), the logarithm of (one plus) the number of drilled tracts
that were productive (HITPOST; again, zero if there are no hits),
and the mean of the logarithm of discounted revenues on
productive tracts (REVPOST; It equals zero if there are no hits).
For example, HITPOST In the fourth year after acquisition is the
logarithm of the number of productive tracts drilled In that area In
the preceding three years. The post-sale variables all qual zero
in the first year after the sale date, and so do notappear In the
year 1 regressions.
The data set also Includes several other variables of note.
BID is the logarithm of the winning bid for the tract, and
10represents our best measure of pre-sale beliefs about the value
of the tract by the winning firm. Of course, a firm's bid is some
fraction of Its expectation of tract value, where this fraction
depends on the perceived degree of competition as well as the
precision of ex ante information. Nevertheless, a significant
component of the difference across tracts In prior expectations of
value Is likely to be accounted for by the bid level.
To account for the level of competition, we also include
the logarithm of the number of bids submitted for each tract
(NBID), as well as a dummy variable that equals one if the
winning bid was the only bid submitted (ONEBID). We also
include a Nmoney left on the table variable, MLT, defined as the
logarithm of the ratio of the highest to the second highestbid. In
cases where there is one bid, the announced reserve priceis
employed instead of the second highest bid. Because moneyleft
on the table has a different connotation in this event, wealso
include a ONEBID x MIX interaction term.All of these
"competition variables might affect subsequent drillingdecisions
if firms' expectations of tract profitability change when they see
whether, and how much, other firms bid. For example, they may
learn to their surprise that other firms did not share their optimistic
expectations, and so be less likely to begin exploration.
Alternatively, if they knew beforehand that theyalone were
optimistic, then they wilt have bid lessrelative to their
expectations and, for a given bid level, they will be more likelyto
initiate exploration.
11In order to account for the severity of potential war of
attrition problems, we also Include HEAF, a Herflndahl index of
the dispersion of lease holdings among solo bidders in the
relevant area and sale year. For this measure, bids are classified
as solo if there was one bidder, or only one experienced partner
(and that firm had at least a fifty percent share) in a Joint bid. For
each area and sale year, we compute each bidder's share of the
leases acquired by solo bidders. HERF Is the sum of these
shares squared. It equals one If one firm acquired all the solo bid
leases, and 1/N if N firms split the leases equally. Thus higher
values of HERF correspond to more asymmetric lease holdings
and, as we shall see later, greater coordination in the
noncooperative equilibria of wars of attrition. In particular, In
areas with high values of HERF, there should be less delay due
to strategic information acquisition. We also include PCTJT,
which is defined as the fraction of leases in the relevant area and
sale year that were acquired by joint bidders (excluding those that
were classified as solo for the construction of HERF). The Idea
is that higher values of PCTJT may be associated with situations
where wars of attrition are less likely to arise.
Our data set also Includes tract characteristics, such as
the logarithm of tract acreage (ACRE) and the date of sale. Some
blocks that are ex ante believed to be more valuable are split into
two tracts for the wildcat auction. Such divisions may exacerbate
war of attrition problems, unless the tracts are known to be
productive, In which case tracts with smaller acreage are more
12likely to be drilled right away. We include the ACRE variable to
capture these effects.ACRE is unlikely to reflect scale
economies.
We employ a set of yearly dummy variables, to account for
vajiations in oil and gas prices and expectations of these prices,
as well as year-to-year variations In the perceived productivity of
tracts offered for sale. There Is substantial variability over time In
the productivity of leased tracts.
We also employ a set of area dummy variables, to capture
area-specific variations In perceived deposits or in drilling costs,
that might not be reflected In the bids.
The dummy variable REOFFER equals one If the tract Is
being reoffered. Tracts may be sold a second (or third) time if the
government previously rejected the high bid, or if a previous
leaseholder relinquished the lease without drilling. There are 158
reoffered tracts in our sample, 107 of which were reoffered after
a high bid was rejected.
Finally, Hendricks and Porter (1992) document that a
substantial fraction of bids are joint bids. The Incentives to
conduct risky activities such as exploration may differ for bidding
consortia, as suggested by Mark Wotfson (1985) for example.
Accordingly, the dummy variable JOINT equals one if the winning
bid is submitted by a consortium of firms. We also experimented
with dummy variables for the different types of joint and solo bids,
as described by Hendricks and Porter (1992), but JOINT appears
to be sufficient for our purposes.
13IV. AGGREGATE DRIWNG AC11VflY
Wenow describe our detailed annual data set, covering
1954 through 1979. Table 3 indicates, for each wildcat sale year,
the timing of Initial exploratory drilling, and the number of leases
that were allowed to expire without any drilling. The U-shaped
pattern in hazard rates is also apparent at annual frequencies, as
demonstrated In the final row of the table. Also, note that a
similar pattern emerges for each sale year. There is yew-to-year
variation, but the aggregation of constant but heterogeneous
hazards over several sales does not seem to be the explanation
for the U-shaped aggregate hazard rate. Heterogeneity across or
within sales can account for negative duration dependence, or a
decreasing hazard function, but it cannot explain the increasing
hazard function at the end of the lease term.
Table 4 takes a first look at the determinants of drilling
activity. For each year of the lease, it reports the number of tracts
not yet explored (the risk set), and how many were drilled, as well
as characteristics of the two sets. The average number of
bidders is reported, together with the mean of the logarithm of the
high bid in 1972 dollars (BID). HIT describes the number of
explored tracts where there was subsequent production, and REV
the mean of the logarithm of discounted revenues on productive
tracts. (Again, production is valued at wellhead prices in 1972
dollars In the sale year, and discounted at a five percent rate. To
the extent that firms anticipatedany post-sale changes in real
prIces, this is a flawed measure of revenues. However, like the
14history variable REVPOST, REVcapturesbig strikes.It may be
preferable to view REVasan output measure, where relative
prices at the sale date indicate how to aggregate oil, gas,
condensate and miscellaneous production.)Finally, BIDDIF
measures the difference between BID on tracts that were drilled,
and the average level of BID on tracts in the risk set that were
sold in the same year. (This is akin to accounting for sale year
specific fixed effects.)
Table 4 indicates that In each lease year, tracts that were
a priori judged to be more productive, as Indicated by BID, were
more likely to be drilled. That Is, BIDDIF Is significantly positive
throughout However, the magnitude and significance level of
BIODIF wanes further into the lease term. Note also that hit rates,
and deposit sizes conditional on a hit, fall over the lease term,
and the decreases are largest after the first year and In the final
year of the lease. We believe that there are a setof tracts where
the prior expectation of profits is sufficiently high that they are
likely to be drilled immediately. The remainder are held In
reserve, and we argue below that while prior expectations
continue to matter, the early drilling experience on tracts sold in
that area in the same sale is an Important determinant of
subsequent drilling decisions. Note also that averagebids on
drilled tracts fall more than hit rates or average revenues from the
second year of the lease term through the fourth year, so that ex
post tract profits are increasing over these three yearsof the
lease term for the set of tracts that are drilled. This pattern is
15consistent with the acquisition of payoff relevant information.
Finally, the quality of tracts drilled in the last year of the lease is
significantly lower, as reflected by the hitrateand REV.
In this sample, the mean winning bid on the 602
unexplored tracts Is $2.86 million dollars (In 1972 dollars). (The
mean winning bid for the entire sample of 2,255 wildcat tracts is
$6.07 million.) It Is worth repeating that abandonment of a tract,
without conducting exploratory drilling, entails walking away from
substantial sunk costs on average. As a matter of comparison,
the average drilling costs on the 897 unproductive tracts in our
sample are $1.52 million, based on American Petroleum Institute
estimates.
We now turn to a regression based examination of the
determinants of the incidence of initial drilling activity, for each
year of the lease. Tables 5A and 58 report the estimates from a
linear probability model and a probit regression, respectively. For
each year of the lease term, the sample is the risk set, the set of
tracts not yet explored. The dependent variable in both Tables is
a dummy variable equalling one If exploratory drilling began in
that year. The explanatory variables are described in Section 3,
and include separate sets of dummy variables for each saleyear
and each area. (Because only 15 tracts were sold in 1976, there
Is one dummy variable for 1976 and 1977.) Thepost-sale
changes in the area-specific drilling history variables are relevant,
and reported, only for the last fouryears of the lease. All non-
qualitative variables are expressed in logarithms, so that the
16coefficients in the linear probability model of Table 5A can be
interpreted as the change in the probability 0 drilling a tract in
the risk set that year associated with a one per cent change in
the independent variable, evaluated at the sample means. (To
obtain an elasticity measure, dMde by the appropriate annual
hazardrate.)
Note that the BID coefficient is initially large and
significant, but also that it falls over the lease term, and is
negative and insignificant by the final year. The coefficients of the
other bidding variables indicate that leaseholders do not respond
much to the information revealed by their rivals' bids.In
particular, the coefficient of the variable measuring money left on
the table, MLT, is an order of magnitude smaller than that of BID,
and insignificant. Alternatively, this information may have been
anticipated by the winning firm when it submitted its bid, and
hence is included in BID.
In the first year of the lease term, HERF is positive and
significant. This is consistent with asymmetries of lease holdings
mitigating any information externalities an enhancing coordination,
and therefore reducing any incentive to delay.
Finally, DRPOST is positive and significant throughout the
lease term. That is, there is more drilling in areas with substantial
post-sale activity, all else equal.If one views DRPOST as a
measure of sample size, and HITPOST the number of positive
outcomes, then the relative magnitudes of their coefficientsis
somewhat surprising. One might expect the number of positive
17outcomes to have a larger coefficient,andperhaps also that the
DAPOST coefficient would be negative. The sum of the two
coefficients is positive, as expected, Indicating that proportional
increases In DRPOST and HITPOSTIncreasethe likelihood of
drilling. The findings suggest that there may be significant
unobservable heterogeneity across areas, specific to particular
sale dates, that area specific fixed effects do not capture, that are
correlated with DRPOST.
The results from these tables should be viewed as
suggestive. We have concentrated on relatively simple functional
forms, because of uncertainty on our part about the information
set facing lease holders. The Issue is whether and when
Information becomes available publicly. We have experimented
with different decision frequencies, such as quarterly, and a
variety of lag structures for the information variables. The
reported specification is representative, and (to our minds)
plausible a priori.Firms can certainly observe when their
neighbors are drilling, and hits would be difficult to disguise. (For
example, developmental wells must be drilled.) More problematic
is the implicit assumption that actualproduction levels are
observable. Annual royalty payments are observable, and Initial
production is correlated with eventual production, so that our
discounted production measure is probably anoisy proxy of what
firms observe. Thismay explain why REVPOST does not appear
to have much of an effect on drillingdecisions, except In the last
year of the lease.
18V. DRIWNG OUTCOMES AND ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS
Tables 6 and 7 report on the determinants of the
probability that a drilled tact is productive, and the logarithm of
discounted revenues conditional on a hit, for the set of tracts
drilled In each of the five years after the sale date. The set of
regressors is the same as In Tables 5A and 58. Tables 6A and
63 describe the estimates from a linear probability model and a
probit regression, respectively, where the dependent variable Is
a dummy variable equal to one if the tract produced positive
discounted revenues, or was a hit by our nomenclature. Table 7
describes a least squares regression for the set of productive
tracts. (Analogous results are obtained if the two regressions are
combined into a Tobit estimating equation, but there appears to
be a gain in not so restricting the mass point.)
The idea behind these regressions is to see whether the
determinants of drilling activity are correlated with drilling
outcomes. There is an obvious sample selection problem in that
we observe outcomes only on tracts that are viewed most
favorably and hence drilled. Nevertheless, within the set of drilled
tracts, one can still ask how accurate ex ante information Is.
For example, the BID coefficients mirror those in Tables 5A
and SB. ACRE Is initially negative and (marginally) significant,
consistent with smaller tracts being more productive by design.
Also, HERF is not significant to begin with, as one would expect
If ft reflects the selection of a particular equilibrium timing pattern,
rather than being correlated with actual productivity differences.
19Note that the money left on the table variable, MLT, is initially
negative and significant, indicating that firms may not correctly
update their beliefs after the auction.
Finally, DAPOST Is often negative and significant, In
contrast to the coefficients In Tables 5A and 5B. (HITPOST Is
often positive and significant, as one might expect, and in
accordance with Tables 5A and 5B.) To the extent that the
positive coefficients of DAPOST In the drilling equation reflect
unobservable area specific heterogeneities, the negative
coefficients In the productivity equations Indicate that firms are
not processing Information optimally. Of course, this finding
should be viewed as preliminary.
Especially In the final columns of Table 7, there are not
many degrees of freedom In the reported regressions. For
purposes of compaiison, Table 8 reports full sample estimates
corresponding to the decisions modelled in Tables 5 through 7.
The five years are pooled together, and the expost drilling
outcome variables dropped. The results are broadly consistent
with those In the preceding Tables.
Finally, Table 9 presents estimates from a pooled logit
estimator of the drilling decision. The fiveyears are pooled
together In the likelihood function, but the coefficients are not
restricted to be equal in the fiveyears, and the ex post drilling
outcome variables vary over the lease horizon. Therefore, the
coeffcients and a subet of theregressors are time-varying. A tract
drilled in the thirdyear of the lease (say) then enters the
20likelihood function threetimes,reflecting the decision not to drill
in the first two years. Table 9 differs from its predecessors, in that
area-specific dummies are not included. (A full set of year-
specific dummies are Included.) The results are similar to those
in Tables 5A and SB, and especially to corresponding results
when area-specific dummies are not included.
We conclude that the results reported in Sections IV and
V are relatively robust.
VI. A SIMPLE ThEORETiCAL MODEL
Suppose that OCS drilling programs are Indeed the
outcome of a non-cooperative game of timing. We now describe
a simple, and probably too simplistic, theoretical model, In order
to demonstrate the social costs of uncoordinated drilling activity.
Consider an area with two adjacent wildcat leases, where
the bidding process has resulted in ownership of mineral rights
by two different firms. Suppose that the lease values are perfectly
correlated and equal to V, where V equals 1 with common
probability p, and zero with probability 1-p. A firm must pay fixed
costs c to initiate a drilling program, where these costs are
independent of whether the tract Is productive. The valueof
productive leases, here normalized to equal one, may be thought
of as revenues net of royalty payments and the costs of
developmental, as opposed to exploratory, wells.Then c
represents the costs of exploratory drilling. Assumefor the
moment that c is less than p, the expected value of a lease, so
that the owner of a single Isolated lease would choose to conduct
21exploratory drilling. Also assume that each firm can observe the
outcome of its rival's drilling. There is then an informational
externality, since a firm can avoid incurring the drilling costs of
dry holes If Its rival drills first. Finally, lease terms are of length I
periods, and firms discount future profits according to a common
discount factor . On the OCS, an appropriate period length is
approximately a quarter, corresponding to the amount of time
necessary to initiate an exploratory drilling program, and so a five
year lease term translates into I equalling 20 quarters.
A strategy for each firm specifies the probability of drilling
each quarter, as a function of the state of the world, conditional
on not having drilled previously. Here, the state vector is easy to
describe, as Is a portion of the optimal strategy. There are three
relevant states each period after the first (not including the length
of time left in the lease term). First, the rival firm may not have
drilled yet, either. Second, the rival may have drilled and come
up empty. In that event, V Is known to equal zero, and the firm
will choose not to drill. Third, if the rival firm has drilled and the
leases are productive, then the firm should drill with probability
one. Therefore, in order to compute a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium1 it is necessary only to solve for the probability of
drilling each period, given that no one has drilled yet
The game Is solved recursively. In the last period, If there
has not been any drilling, both firms will drill, with(positive)
expected payoff p-c. In period T-1, if there has been no prior
drilling, drilling yields expected payoff p-c. If instead a firm waits,
22and its rival drills with probability q, then the expected payoff is
[qp(1-c) + (1-q)(p-c)]. The first term in the square brackets
corresponds to the event that the rival drills and the tract is
productive, and so a payoff of 1 -c Is realized. The second term
corresponds to the event where the rival also doesn't drill, in
which case both drill In the final period. A third term, excluded
because the payoff Is zero, describes the event where the other
firm drills a dry hole. The firm will be Indifferent between drilling
and waiting if and only if
q,. = (1-p)(p-c)Ipc(1-p) = q'.
Here q is positive by assumption, and It Is lessthanone If p-c .c
pp(1 -c), or if the discounted profits from waiting one period, and
then drilling in the event that the lease Is productive, exceed the
expected profits from drilling immediately. The game Is a war of
attrition if the payoffs from following (letting the other firm move
first) exceed the payoff from leading, and then q is less than one.
If p is high enough, or c low enough, then the gains from waiting
are insufficient, and q exceeds one. In equilibrium, if both firms
drill with probability q, their expected payoffs equal p-c.
In period T-2, if no drilling has occurred, the payoff from
drilling immediately Is again p-c.if the firm waits, Its expected
payoff is exactly the same as from waiting in period T-1, since by
construction the expected payoff in period T-1, In the event that
the other firm also does not drill in T-2, is p-c. Hence, In
equilibrium, q. = q (assuming that qt is less than one). Thus,
despite the finite lease term, the game is stationary, In the sense
23that q = q for t = 1, 2, ... ,T-1. As described above, q1- equals
one.(Note that there are also pure strategy asymmetric
equilibria. For example, one firm could drill with probability one
in all periods when there is no previous drilling, and the other
could choose to wait in every such period, except for period T.
This pair of strategies is also a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
as long asp-cc pp(1-c).)
The sequence of hazard rates implied by the symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium, described by the vector (q1, q2,...,
q.1), does not correspond to what we observe in the data. The
theoretical hazard rate q pertains to tracts In areas with no prior
Ørilling. Instead, we observe if a tract is drilled in a given period,
whether or not there has been prior drilling. In terms of the above
example, this means that tracts not yet drilled include those
where adjacent tracts were explored.Tracts adjacent to
successfully explored tracts will be drilled. Those next to dry
holes will be abandoned1 for practical purposes. The number of
abandoned tracts increases over the lease term, but is included
in the risk set. Therefore, the implication is that the empirical
hazard rate is decreasing In periods 2 through Ti, even ignoring
heterogeneities in q across areas. The hazard function is
derived in the Appendix. If tracts we thought to be sufficiently
good prospects, so that p-c Is large, then q1 equals one In those
areas.
The empirical hazard rate will increase in period T as long
as q is sufficiently small. For example, if T = 20, = 0.99, p =
240.5, and c = 1/8, roughly consistent with our sample averages,
then q = 0.06. Tedious but straightforward computation implies
that the sequence of empirical hazards equals (.060, .086, .084,
.030, .310). These parameters Imply that 21.9 percent of the
tracts will never be drilled. The overall hazard rate will be U-
shaped, after an increase between the first and second periods,
as observed in the data. A more symmetric U-shape could be
obtained by combining samples of tracts with different
parameters. The hazard rate will increase between the first and
second periods, because tracts drilled In the first period are
productive with probability one half, and thereby Induce drilling on
neighboring tracts In the second period. Roughly speaking, 6
percent are drilled in period 1, half of which are productive.
These successes result in another 3 percent being drilled in
period 2 (their neighbors), together with 6 percent of the
remaining tracts.Note that no unproductive tracts are
abandoned in equilibrium.
In contrast, consider the optimal drilling program, as
implemented by a single owner (or a drilling consortium). There
is no reason to delay drilling beyond the second period1 as profits
are then deferred.The choice is between simuttaneous
exploration of both tracts, and sequential search, In which case
one tract is drilled first. The expected profits from simultaneous
search are 2(p-c). Sequential search yields expected profits (p-c)
+ p(1-c). Sequential search is preferable if pp(1-c) > pc. Note
that this is the condition that ensures that q Is less than one. If
25q equals one, then both the optimal and the Nash equilibrium
drilling plans entail immediate drilling of both tracts. Otherwise,
the two drilling plans differ.
It is also tedious but straightforward to show that the joint
expected discounted profits In the mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium equal 2(p-c), or the expected profits from
simuttaneous search, independent of the lease length 1. The
simple intuition underlying this result is that the probability of
drilling in any period, q, given that nobody has drilled yet, is
calculated so that in any period the leaseholders are indifferent
between drilling and waiting. But drilling in the first period just
yields the simuttaneous search payoff. In contrast, the bptlmal
sequential plan (assuming that q is less than one) yields
expected discounted payoff (p-c) + pp(1 -c). For the numerical
example given above, the noncooperative equilibrium is 7.2
percent less efficient than the optimal sequential plan, as
measured by total expected discounted profits.
To highlight the differences, consider variations in the cost
of drilling, c. Both plans entail immediate drilling of both tracts if
c Is less than (1 -p)p/(1 -pp), denoted c1, which Is less than p. The
duopolists will never drill if c exceeds p. However, the monopolist
will drill one tract if c exceedsp, as long as c is less than
(1 +)p/(1 +pp), denoted c2, since the expected value is positive.
Even though the optimal plan expects to losemoney on the first
tract drilled, the option of drilling the second tract when it is
known to be productive is valuable. If c exceedsc2, neither plan
26prescribes drilling. For intermediate values of c, between c1 and
the optimal plan entails sequential drilling, whereas the Nash
equilibrium Is a mixed strategy for the interval [C1, p], and there
Is no drilling for c on the Interval (p. ;]. For low values of q, or
high values of c, there is Insufficient drilling relative to the optimal
plan prior to period T, and costly duplication in the final period.
For low values of c, there Is costly duplication of drilling effort
relative to the optimum throughout the lease term.
To repeat, the optimal drilling plan In this simple
environment never dictates delay beyond the second period, so
that the U-shaped pattern of the empirical hazard rate appears to
be Inconsistent with optimal drilling. Further, deviations from
optimality appear to be consistent with the predictions of the
Nash equilibrium outcome. The model above clearly abstracts
from some important features of the OCS drilling environment, but
we believe that the abstractions do not dramatically affect
predictions concerning the hazard rate. Of course, the empirical
hazard rate could reflect optimal coordination of drilling on a
subset of tracts, and noncooperative drilling on others, but then
there are inefficiencies on the latter set.
In a typical OCS area there are more than two tracts, with
more than two lease holders. Increasing the number of players
can exacerbate the incentives for delay in the Nash equilibrium
relative to the social optimum, as the informational externalities
are larger. For example, suppose the above model is extended
to include N tracts, all with the same value and the Bernoulli
27distribution described above. Suppose further that there are N
independent lease owners. Then the equilibriumqt that we
derived above describes the probability that one of the N-i rivals
drills. The probability that a single firm drills falls accordingly.
Asymmetries in the distribution of leaseholdings can help
firms coordinate their drilling decisions. For example, suppose
that the N leases In the above example we acquired by two firms,
with one firm, say firm 1, holding N-i leases, and the other firm,
say firm 2, holding only onelease. In period T-1, if there has
been no prior drilling, the expected payoff to firm 1 from drilling
one lease, and responding optimally in period T to theinformation
revealed by the outcome, Is (p-c) + pp(N-2)(1-c). If firm 1 waits,
and film 2 drills In period T-1 with probability q, the expected
payoff to firm 1 is (N-1)[qp(i-c) + (1-q)(p-c)].Firm I is
Indifferent between drilling and not drilling if
q = [(p-c) + pp(i-c) + p(N-1)c(1-pfl / [(N-1)c(1-p)].
But this expression exceeds one If (p-c) + p(1-c) > 0 or,
equivalently, if c is less than c2. Thus, conditional on reaching
period T-1 without any drilling, firm 1 will drill with probability one
and firm 2 will wait. A backward induction argument establishes
that this is the case for every period t = 1 ,...,T-1. Hence, there is
no equilibrium with delay. If the value of the sequential drilling
program is positive, and exceeds that of drillingall N-i teases
simultaneously, firm 1 drills one tract in period one and firm 2
wafts.
28A more complicated model would endow each of the firms
with private information concerning the value of their leases.
Then delay Is an informative event, as it signals that a firm Is not
very optimistic. Wilson (1986) characterizes the equilibria of wars
of attrition in some similar cases. Hendricks and Kovenock
(1989) show that In a two period model, the equilibrium outcomes
are qualitatively similar to those of the simple symmetric model
sketched above. That is, there Is underlnvestment on tracts that
are regarded as marginally profitable, and overinvestment In areas
that are believed to be profitable. The effect of learning about the
information held by a rival is likely to be swamped by the
Incentives captured In our simple model, at least on the OCS,
where half of the explored tracts we not productive. In addition,
Hendricks and Kovenock argue that inefficiencies are not likely to
be resolved through bargaining or a resale market, due to the
presence of private geological information.
VII. CONCLUSION
If our hypothesis that drilling programs on the OCS are the
outcome of a noncooperative Nash equilibrium is correct, we are
left with a puzzle. There are several avenues for firms to
coordinate their actions on the OCS. First, Joint bidding consortla
are legal, except those invoMng two or more of eight designated
firms after 1975. Second, once a common pool has been
discovered, revenues from developmental wells are usually
unitized. Unitization agreements, which are encouraged by the
federal government, allocate revenues from a common pool
29according to a prespeclfied rule, such as acreage owned above
the pool,Inorder to prevent overdrilling of developmental wells.
(See Gary Ubecap and Steven Wiggins (1985) and Wiggins and
Ubecap (1985).)
The puzzle is why apparently noncooperative behavior
occurs in the exploratory drilling phase. Pad of the answer may
concern asymmetries of Information.In the bidding game,
Informational heterogeneities are present, because firms Interprdt
Imperfect seismic information differentially. As a consequence,
Joint ventures between firms actively engaged in exploratory
drÜling are relatively uncommon. Instead, It Is as common for
firms to turn to outside partners to raise capital or to bid alone.
An obstacle to the formation of joint bidding agreements is the
incentive to free ride on the information gathering expenditures of
prospective partners. (For more detail, see Hendricks and Porter
(1992).) Therefore, firms do not necessarily emerge from the
bidding process in strong muttilateral arrangements.
Unitization agreements are common on federal lands,
unlike state lands, in part because negotiations occur relatively
early in the process, when information is not too asymmetric. In
terms of the model above, the uncertainty regarding the presence
of deposits Is not resolved, and uncertainty remains about the
distribution of rents between the leaseholders. Unitization on
federal lands typically occurs after the leases are acquired, and
prior to exploratory drilling. However, it is notable that unitization
agreements pertain to common pools, and not to fields that share
30common geological structures. In our sample, only 383 of the
2,255 tracts were unitized.
An agreement with respect to exploratory drilling of
necessity must be consummated prior to the resolution of
uncertainty concerning whether a pool, or a broader area, Is
productive. While unitization agreements probably encourage
coordination of drilling on common pools, this bargaining
mechanism is not available for broader areas. In those cases,
firms' expectations of their shares (nay be difficult to reconcile,
due to differential Interpretations of seismic data, and yet some
sources of uncertainty are common. Then one would expect
noncooperative behavior to ensue.
Finally, an obstacle to coordination in the exploration
phase is that firms may fear sacrificing informational, or expertise,
advantages in future auctions. For example, if In the proôess of
coordinating drilliAg decisions firms must reveal how they interpret
seismic data, then they may lose a competitive advantage. This
is another example of potential free rider problems.
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34APPENDIX
In this Appendix, we derive the hazard function for the
model with symmetric firms In Section VI, corresponding to the
empirical hazard function depicted In Figures 1 and 2.
Consider a sample consisting of pairs of tracts, all with the
same equilibrium q, the probability of drilling In period t = 1 ,...,T-1
if there is no prior drilling. Letnt denote the proportion of the
sample that is drilled in period t, and let I-i, denote the hazard rate
in period t (the proportion of the risk set In period t that Is drilled).
Equivalently, the sample size Is normalized to equal one. Then
n1 equals q, as all leaseholders drill with probability q. The risk
set in period 1 is the full sample, and so H1 also equals q.
For any pair of tracts, the probability that both firms waft
in period 1 is (142 and then each tract is drilled in period 2 with
probability q. Both drill in period I with probability q2, in which
case neither tract is In the risk set in period 2. A firm waits and
its neighbor drills in period 1 with probability q(1-q), and the
neighboring tract is productive with probability p. Thus, n2 equals
q(1-q)2 + pq(1-q). The risk set in period 2 is 1-q, and so H2 =




for t = 2,...,T-2.
In period 1, all tracts
In the area. Hence fl-1 =
condition for H.,. > H is
conditions are q <p and q
are drilled If there is no prior drilling
[(1-q) + pq](142T4. A sufficient
that r > n, for which sufficient
<iia
For t = 2,...,T-1, nt = [q(1-q) + pq](1-q)4. That is, n
n2 times (1 -q), the probability that neither tract in an
drilled prior to period t-1. The hazard rate H equals n, I
+ ... + n.)]. It is straightforward to show that F-Is> H,
36Table 1: Quarterly Hazard Rates 1954-1990
Quarter *ofTracts Risk Set *Drilled Hazard Rate Std. Error
1 6178 6178 171 0.0277 0.0021
2 6178 6007 334 0.0556 0.0030
3 6178 5673 377 0.0665 0.0033
4 5799 4917 320 0.065]. 0.0035
5 5799 4597 242 0.0526 0.0033
6 5550 4106 189 0.0460 0.0033
7 5550 3917 133 0.0340 0.0029
8 5156 3390 102 0.0301 0.0029
9 5137 3269 96 0.0294 0.0030
10 4942 2978 89 0.0299 0.0031
11 4942 2869 68 0.0235 0.0028
12 4625 2504 53 0.0212 0.0029
13 4625 2451 61 0.0249 0.0032
14 4443 2208 63 0.0285 0.0035
15 4320 2022 55 0.0212 0.0036
16 4320 1961 68 0.0346 0.0041
17 4320 1899 76 0.0400 0.0045
18 4292 1795 73 0.0407 0.0047
19 4247 1677 91 0.0543 0.0055
20 4247 1586 118 0.0744 0.0066
21 4247 1466 104 0.0708 0.0067
22 4227 1344 7 0.0052 0.0020
23 4112 1222 5 0.0041 0.0018
Never 4112 1217 0.2960
Th.lItv.rc.t.oryr.fsrsto tracts that nr. nv.r drlI.1.d.In thisen.. ths flasard k.t. .quat. th.
tractionof tracts that nr. n.nr drilJsd. out oftha ..t for stsicb ZS quart.ra of data •rs availabi..







-U0Table 2: Quarterly Hazard Rates 1954-197E
Quarter *ofTracts Risk Set *Drilled Hazard Rate Std. Error
L 2255 2255 155 0.0687 0.0053
2 2255 2100 223 0.1062 0.0067
3 2255 1877 191 0.1018 0.0070
4 2255 1686 164 0.0973 0.0072
5 2255 1522 134 0.0880 0.0073
6 2255 1388 106 0.0764 0.0071
7 2255 1282 62 0.0484 0.0060
8 2255 1220 61 0.0500 0.0062
9 2255 1159 63 0.0544 0.0067
10 2255 1096 49 0.0447 0.0062
11 2255 1047 41 0.0392 0.0060
12 2255 1006 35 0.0348 0.0058
13 2255 971 36 0.0371 0.0061
14 2255 935 43 0.0460 0.0069
15 2255 892 30 0.0336 0.0060
16 2255 862 46 0.0534 0.0077
17 2255 816 68 0.0588 0.0082
18 2255 768 52 0.0677 0.0091
19 2255 716 52 0.0726 0.0097
20 2255 664 62 0.0934 0.0113
21 2255 602 44 0.0731 0.0106
22 2255 558 5 0.0090 0.0040
23 2255 553 5 0.0090 0.0040
Never 2255 548 0.2430































































































































 Table 3: Drilling Timing by tear of Sale
Year of Initial Drilling
Year Number of
Tracts Sold 1 2 3 4 5 Never
1954 109 7 11 17 17 18 39
1955 121 5 9 5 13 25 64
1960 147 35 33 7 13 14 45
1962 411 89 62 50 53 57 100
1967 158 70 21 10 7 15 35
1968 110 44 13 6 5 2 40
1970 119 81 26 1. 0 0 11
1972 178 105 22 9 5 7 30
1973 106 57 15 3 2 5 24
1974 325 119 52 28 16 24 86
1975 236 39 51 24 15 24 83
1976 15 7 1 2 0 3 2
1977 80 28 17 7 3 11 14
1978 68 21 10 14 2 6 15
1979 72 26 20 5 4 3 14
Total 2255 133 363 188 155 214 602
(0.325) (0.161) (0.083) (0.069) (0.095) (0.267)
(0.325) (0.239] (0.162] (0.160] [0.262) --
number in C ) par.nth..ea is the rnrsber of trects driLled in that year, as a frectioi, of thetotal
number oftr.ctesoldinthes. year. The m.rirsCI bracket.is th, hazard zeta: thenjrt.r oX
tractsdrilledas afr.ctionof tracts soldinthe s. year. and not yet drilled.Table 4: Tract Characteristics, by Year of Initial Drilling
Year After Acquisition
1 2 3 4 5
Risk Set
Number 2255 1522 1159 971 816
BID 14.46 13.91 13.64 13.52 13.46
(1.62) (1.48) (1.43) (1.44) (1.46)
*ofBids 3.76 2.87 2.51 2.41 2.30
(3.26) (2.47) (2.15) (2.13) (2.06)
Tracts Drilled
Number 733 363 188 155 214
(fraction) (0.325) (0.239) (0.162) (0.160) (0.262)
BID 15.62 14.77 14,26 13.82 13,50
(1.26) (1.31) (1.18) (1.31) (1.18)
BIDDIF 0.769 0.679 0.579 0.525 0.213
(0.041) (0.058) (0.078) (0.098) (0.075)
*ofBids 5.62 4.00 3.06 2.99 2.33
(3.86) (3.03) (2.22) (2.37) (1.75)
HIT 403 163 87 70 82
(fraction) (0.550) (0.449) (0.463) (0.452) (0.383)
REV 16.29 15.52 15.55 15.52 15.22
(1.54) (1.64) (1.71) (1.96) (1.55)
Exc.pt.4..n not.d, •t.nd.rd d.vi.tiot. .r. di.plsy.d it. p.rnthss.s. BIDDIF is t1s diff.rnc. b.tw..o U..
BID(U..1o.rit of U.. w1nninbidIt. 1972 dollar.) .ndU..snrfl. valus of BID on tr.ct. in U.. risk
s•t th.t wsr•solAin U.. Se. y.n. For 511)01?, .tt,d.rd .rror. of U.. sep].. e.n. Sr. displty.d in
p.r.nth.s...Table SA: Least Squares Estimates of the Probability of Initial Drilling
by Year After Acquisition
Year After Acquisition
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
ACRE -0.036 -0.001 0.069 0.099 0.074
(0.028) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036)
$310 0.025 0.019 0.043 0.048 0.038
(0.021) (0.034) (0.038) (0.042) (0.048)
ONEBID 0.126 0.126 -0.084 0.032 -0.149
(0.046) (0.052) (0.055) (0.057) (0.063)
BID 0.148 0.101 0.025 0.020 -0.028
(0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
MLT -0.010 -0.016 -0.008 0.019 -0.026
(0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023)
ONEBID*MLT -0.030 -0.042 0.028 -0.029 0.058
(0.018) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028)
JOINT 0.009 0.005 -0.006 0.016 0.003
(0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.029)
REOFFER 0.024 0.008 0.155 -0.055 0.152
(0.041) (0.046) (0.051) (0.061) tO.065)
HERF 0.141 0.077 0.044 -0.045 -0.259
(0.070) (0.079) (0.084) (0.090) (0.100)
PCTJT 0.098 0.007 0.095 -0.022 -0.086
(0.066) (0.080) (0.089) (0.095) (0.107)
DRPOST 0.083 0.083 0.127 0.100
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.036)
HITFOST 0d16 0.060 0.040 0.012
(0.037) (0.031) (0.038) (0.041)
REVPOST -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 0.028
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Sample Size 2255 1522 1159 971 816
Adjusted R2 0.310 0.260 0.157 0.190 0.441
Area Dummies:
Number 50 48 47 47 47
F-statistic 2.58 2.09 1.61 1.64 4.55
% of SSR 11.90 16.46 26.20 25.66 29.86
-
Standard•rrorsartdi.pityin parnth.ass. Each rflr.sajon incJ.vd.. a setof 14 ys.r-.p.cific thy
variabl.s• atwellas a fuLl. set of area thay variablas. The scpte j.thesat of tracts not yet driil.sd
bythe year in qu.stion. Thedependent variable equa].s on. if Ui. tract was first drillad in that year.Table SB: Probit Estimates of the Probability of Initial Drilling,
by Year After Acquisition
Year After Acquisition
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
ACRE -0.076 0.206 0.633 0.916 0.329
(0.119) (0.150) (0.257) (0.292) (0.245)
MMD 0.046 0.101 0.188 0.090 0.093
(0.103) (0.146) (0.178) (0.219) (0.280)
ONEBID -0.039 0.411 -0.619 0.128 -0.816
(0.230) (0.258) (0.312) (0.338) (0.385)
BID 0.575 0.440 0.155 0.216 -0.124
(0.050) (0.066) (0.079) (0.093) (0.110)
MLT -0.037 -0.090 -0.059 -0.001 -0.199
(0.047) (0.079) (0.095) (0.103) (0.141)
ONEBID*MLT 0.042 -0.097 0.211 -0.096 0.340
(0.077) (0.101) (0.127) (0.142) (0.177)
JoINT 0.029 0.002 -0.068 0.131 0.086
(0.075) (0.099) (0.125) (0.150) (0.165)
REOFFER 0.174 0.096 0.555 -0.179 0.620
(0.151) (0.187) (0.224) (0.334) (0.301)
HERF 0.750 0.520 -0.008 0.048 -0.324
(0.293) (0.356) (0.484) (0.523) (0.554)
PCTJT 0.490 0.060 0.558 -0.012 0.140
(0.266) (0.346) (0.336) (0.516) (0.594)
DRPOST 0.391 0.567 0.766 0.846
(0.115) (0.143) (0.170) (0.204)
F{JTPOST 0.346 0.055 0.066 -0.464
(0.153) (0.182) (0.212) (0.232)
REVPOST 0.006 0.001 0.015 0.139
(0.010) (0.016) (0.023) (0.028)
Sample Size 2255 1522 1159 971 816
Area Dummies:
Number 50 48 47 47 47
CM-squared 145.3 98.6 65.8 80.9 105.0
standard•rror. ci. dt.p1ay.d in p.r.nth...s. Each x.r...ioa includ.. a anof14 y.ar—sp.cifie dy variabt.., as..1jasa full1stofa:..d'ny variablo, m..aaçl.isth. sat, of tracts not ystdrillsd
bythatysa:. ma dsp.ttdn,t v.risbls •qual.otis if t.h• tractwas first driltsd in that isa.Table 6A Least Squares Eitinates of the Probability of Tract Productivity.
by Tear of Initial Drilling
Year After Acquisition
variable 1 2 3 4 5
ACRE -0.109 -0.161 -0.325 0.477 -0.084
(0.070) (0.087) (0.264) (0.294) (0.149)
NBI0 0.042 0.112 -0.184 0.296 -0.070
(0.053) (0.090) (0.131) (0.167) (0.165)
ONEBID -0.128 -0.151 0.040 0.107 -0.021
(0.164) (0.189) (0.282) (0.285) (0.235)
BID 0.111 -0.017 0.068 -0.086 0.031
(0.027) (0.042) (0.058) (0.082) (0.067)
MLT -0.046 0.069 -0.026 0.222 0.197
(0.023) (0.048) (0.075) (0.105) (0.095)
ONEBID*MLT 0.079 -0.011 -0.072 -0.038 -0.190
(0.047) (0.070) (0.097) (0.132) (0.101)
JOINT 0.022 -0.013 0.006 -0.008 0.087
(0.040) (0.064) (0.088) (0.105) (0.098)
REOFFER 0.204 0.016 0.018 0.307 -0.020
(0.092) (0.123) (0.147) (0.311) (0.173)
HERF -0.024 -0.100 -0.331 1.074 0.688
(0.176) (0.252) (0.373) (0.555) (0.323)
PCTJT 0.054 -0.023 -0.533 0.617 0.172
(0.138) (0.217) (0.406) (0.424) (0.305)
URPOST •0137 -0.151 -0.083 0.002
(0.087) (0.161) (0.208) (0.140)
HITPOST 0.200 0.193 0.022 0.136
(0.097) (0.175) (0.217) (0.173)
REVPOST 0.006 -0.008 -0.013 -0.014
(0.008) (0.017) (0.030) (0.020)
Sample Size 733 363 188 155 214
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.111 0.134 0.103 0.028
AreaDummies:
Number 41 38 34 35 35
Fstatistjc 1.20 1.09 1.35 1.03 0.57
% of SSR 25.31 38.10 51.77 46.18 30.06
Ztand.rd•rgor. ax. di.pI.ay.d in paz.nth.s... Each r.sr.a.ion includ.a a ..t of 14 y.ar-sp.cifit dIy
v.rtWj...aanil. as a Liii.]. ..t of at..thyvariahi.... ma sample is the eat of tract.drilledIII that
y.ar.The d.p.nd.ntvariableequal. at. If th.rs ha. b..n oilora..productiot.On that tract.Table 68: Probit Estimates of the Probability of Tract Productivity.
by Year of Initial Drilling
Year Alter Acquisition
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
ACRE -0.375 -0.730 -1.723 1.601 -0.242
(0.214) (0.439) (0.977) (1.014) (0.438)
NBID 0.121 0.354 -0.806 0.893 -0.130
(0.160) (0.270) (0.442) (0.542) (0.525)
ONEBID -0.421 -0.457 0.147 0.490 0.146
(0.514) (0.581) (0.869) (0.959) (0.721)
BID 0.343 -0.041 0.384 -0.049 0.154
(0.081) (0.123) (0.217) (0.268) (0.209)
MLT -0.153 0.205 -0.502 0.619 0.777
(0.072) (0.140) (0.277) (0.378) (0.344)
ONEBID*MLT 0.264 -0.033 0.059 -0.076 -0.790
(0.151) (0.215) (0.306) (0.410) (0.349)
JOINT- 0.068 -0.020 0.092 0.061 0.351
(0.120) (0.190) (0.273) (0.359) (0.303)
REOFFER 0.641 0.059 0.610 1.201 0.209
(0.284) (0.384) (0.459) (1.208) (0.549)
HERF -0.079 -0.311 -1.311 5.969 2.807
(0.559) (0.815) (1.240) (2.420) (1.025)
FCTJT 0.221 -0.049 -2.298 2.360 0.015
(0.419) (0.685) (1.275) (1.558) (0.974)
ORPOST -0.544 -0.831 -1.112 -0.115
(0.288) (0.467) (0.976) (0.488)
HITFOST 0.828 1.047 1.312 0.970
(0.318) (0.546) (0.916) (0.569)
REVPOST 0.028 -0.028 -0.137 -0.156
(0.027) (0.058) (0.110) (0.078)
Sample Size 733 363 188 155 214
Area Dummies:
Number 41 38 34 35 35
Chi-squared 51.7 48.9 53.7 45.6 29.7
Standardexxonare displayed In parentheses.Each resression Itnli.d.. . set of 14 year—specific dune
variables. The sample is the set of tract, drilled in that year. the dependeot variable equals one if
thereha. been oil or 8cc production on that tract.table 1;Deterisinantsof the Lagaritbn of Discounted Pevenueg
on Productive Tracts, by Year of Initial Drilling
YearAfter Acquisition
Variable 1 2 3 4
ACRE -0.501 -0.087 -0.344 3.981 0.112
(0.281) (0.324) (1.166) (2.335) (1.067)
NEID -0.386 0.141 -0.073 -1.702 0093
(0.220) (0.501) (0.619) (1.041) (1.153)
ONEBID -0.059 0.472 -1.497 -3.218 0.607
(0.878) (1.131) (1.382) (2.206) (1.450)
BID 0.600 0.400 0.371 0.152 0.096
(0.110) (0.241) (0.344) (0.540) (0.489)
MLT -0.196 -0.539 -0.542 -0.148 -0.225
(0.106) (0.257) (0.502) (0.681) (0.665)
ONEBID*MLT -0.019 0.036 0.597 0.946 -0.108
(0.020) (0.401) (0.573) (1.014) (0.606)
JoINT -0.013 0.565 -0.581 2.084 0.210
(0.177) (0.336) (0.542) (0.851) (0.662)
REOFFER -0.587 -0.780 -0.071 -1.873 0.263
(0.360) (0.731) (0.857) (2.164) (1.368)
HERF -0.386 1.978 0.006 7.722 0.307
(0.827) (1.509) (2.294) (6.228) (2.002)
PCTJT 0.072 2.237 -0.668 2.764 1.064
(0.628) (1.306) (2.505) (3.614) (2.412)
DRPOST 0.230 0.710 -1.387 0.791
(0.648) (0.847) (2.760) (2.326)
HITPOST 0.575 -1.398 2.644 -0.579
(0.688) (1.117) (2.312) (1.793)
REVPOST -0.083 0.111 -0.436 0.097
(0.050) (0.115) (0.322) (0.238)
Sample Size 403 163 87 70 82
Adjusted R2 0.190 0.152 0.302 0.164 -0.109
Area Dummies:
Number 38 29 25 24 24
F-statistic 1.78 1.06 2.31 1.05 0.63
% of SSR 43.57 36.49 67.79 41.73 38.74
St.ndard•rrors at. dl.ptay.d In par.t.thes.a. tach r.;r.s.Lon incl.ud.. a .et. of 1* yaar—.p.cific d..y
v.riabln.ma eanpi. La Ut. ..t of productiv. tract. drLll.d Li. that y..r.Table 8; Full Sample Estimatea
Pr(Drill) PrlHttIDrill} E[RevIHit)
Variable OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS
ACRE 0.120 0.325 -0.110 -0.348 -0.366
(0.026) (0.103) (0.046) (0.141) (0.187)
NBlD 0.028 0.170 0.043 0.113 -0.265
(0.026) (0.111) (0.037) (0.107) (0.173)
Or4EBID -0.128 -0.055 0.054 0.154 -0.057
(0.044) (0.174) (0.073) (0.209) (0.368)
BID 0.083 0.359 0.080 0.231 0.499
(0.011) (0.04?) (0.017) (0.048) (0.077)
tILT -0.005 -0.028 -0.010 -0.032 -0.265
(0.012) (0.050) (0.018) (0.052) (0.091)
ONEBID*MLT 0.032 0.023 -0.005 -0.015 0.072
(0.017) (0.070) (0.027) (0.076) (0.127)
JOINT 0.004 0.020 0.016 0.045 0.203
(0.018) (0.076) (0.027) (0.076) (0.130)
REOFFER 0.096 0.374 0.059 0.160 -0.370
(0.039) (0,168) (0.055) (0.153) (0.253)
HERF -0.040 0.084 0.143 0.403 0.764
(0.066) (0.259) (0.103) (0.295) (0.505)
PCTJT 0.049 0.366 0.056 0.164 0.410
(0.063) (0.263) (0.090) (0.255) (0.439)
SampleSize 2255 2255 1653 1653 805
Adjusted R2 0.303 NA 0.122 NA 0.182
AreaDummies:
Number 50 50 44 44 41
Test statistic 7.72 157.7 2.42 108.3 2.21
%ofSSR 36.72 NA 36.01 NA 37.31
*
Standard error,Cr. displayed in psrenth.sea.Eachrar..eioi, includes a setcC 14yesr—ap.cific d'my
veriabt.sas well, as -a fullset of areadtyvsriabl,es. Theapt.isthefull set of tracts sold.
drilled, or productive, respectively'. Th. dependentvariebteequals Ofl• if the tract wss tilled, itequals
Oneifit was productive,orStequal. real discounted revenues, r.spectiv.ly.TabLe 9: Pooled Logit Estimates of the Probability of Initial Drilling,
by YearAfter Acquisition'
Year After Acquisition
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
ACRE -0.133 0.069 0.948 1.249 0.557
(0.140) (0.211) (0.380) (0.386) (0.273)
MMD -0.042 0.102 0.205 0.315 -0.093
(0.117) (0.169) (0.231) (0.210) (0.278)
ONEBIO -0.793 0.353 -1.191 0.499 -1.126
(0.327) (0.341) (0.427) (0.435) (0.393)
BID 0.644 0.524 0.187 0.217 -0.044
(0.057) (0.080) (0.106) (0.118) (0.112)
MLT -0.032 -0.095 -0.116 -0.012 -0.352
(0.056) (0.091) (0.139) (0.113) (0.152)
ONEBID*MLT 0.201 -0.110 0.440 -0.237 0.486
(0.097) (0.128) (0.176) (0.185) (0.185)
JOINT 0.029 0.096 -0.060 0.191 -0.002
(0.089) (0.126) (0.175) (0.203) (0.180)
REOFFER 0.149 0.065 0.705 -0.567 0.477
(0.194) (0.254) (0.291) (0.539) (0.283)
HERF 0.850 1.242 0.775 1.051 0.395
(0.326) (0.402) (0.552) (0.537) (0.506)
PCTJT 0.673 0.164 0.781 0.192 0.308
(0.279) (0.422) (0.582) (0.609) (0.526)
DRPOST 0.798 1.026 1.042 0.863
(0.146) (0.185) (0.205) (0.216)
HITFOST 0.012 -0.235 -0.059 -0.241
(0.173) (0.205) (0.209) (0.188)
REVPOST 0.027 0.010 0.012 0.105
(0.013) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026)
Sample Size 2255
'St.ndard•rrors ax. dlspl.ay.d inpaxenthssea. Eachcohn, include.aitt of l year—specific d'r'
variabh... but no are. dtr yartabi... The aa.pha ii the fisu. t.t of tract.. Th• dependent variabLe ii
the year in wtich the tr.ct wit first drilled.